After 11 months of Sisyphean fighting and slow cumulative achievements against Hamas, Israel has destroyed all of Hezbollah's senior leadership and its communication system within 11 days and incapacitated thousands of Hezbollah fighters. What began with the “Pagers attack” gradually and sophisticatedly shifted to a situation where Hezbollah's firing, command, and control capabilities, as well as its decision-making mechanisms, were significantly damaged. We are likely to face difficult days in the near future due to Hezbollah's firing capabilities, but its long-term consequences will resonate deeply.
Here are some key observations:
The Iranian nuclear project: We wrote at the beginning of the week (See here) that we suspect the real goal of the escalation for Israel is to deal a heavy blow to Hezbollah, paving the way for an Israeli strike on the Iranian nuclear project. Hezbollah has been nurtured by Iran as a second-strike capability. Netanyahu’s speech at the UN validates further this hypothesis – the bulk of it was about Iran. There’s no doubt that this thought crosses the minds of the Iranians as they consider their response, and we believe they won’t rush to give Israel an excuse to attack them.
The Iranians face several historic dilemmas:
- The future of the proxy project: The Israeli achievements have been so dramatic and swift that years of extensive resource investment in the proxy project might be challenged by the reformists who have gained power after the election of President Pashkazian. Most likely, Khamenei will continue supporting the proxies, but the level of Iran's investment in it will be challenged.
- The response to Nasrallah’s elimination: Iran's strategy to destroy Israel was based on prolonged attrition warfare rather than a large war. A significant response to Nasrallah's (and Haniyeh’s) elimination could escalate the region into such a war. Therefore, it is not certain that the Iranians will rush to respond directly.
A year after: srael is still fighting but counting significant achievements: In the Gaza Strip, Israel is now fighting a weak guerrilla organization that no longer resembles Hamas’s army at the start of the war. Almost all of Hamas’s leadership has been eliminated, perhaps including Sinwar. The painful point, of course, is the hostages, whose chances of return now seem slimmer. This war objective seems to be drifting further away.
Israel has several structural advantages that make it potentially more resilient (See What are or should be the objectives of escalation in Lebanon?). The cumulative damage of the prolonged war on Israel's enemies is greater. The ethos of ‘Sumud’ (steadfastness) among our enemies relies heavily on coercive 'Moqawama' mechanisms. What we perceive as the resilience of our enemies is, in fact, a testament to the lack of civil courage to resist Hezbollah's takeover of Lebanon’s public space or Hamas's control over Gaza. Therefore, the key to victory over our enemies lies in severely damaging the coercive and organizational mechanisms of our enemies. Israel is doing exactly that against Hezbollah and Hamas.
The internal issue: Israel’s resilience weaknesses are its economy, social and political polarization, and its international standing. Israel’s double credit rating downgrade by Moody’s is dramatic. The report directly criticizes the government's economic management. It is time for more professional governance; it’s enough that the reserve forces are mobilized, there is no tourism or foreign workers, there are boycotts, and the war’s cost is enormous.
Israel needs to cultivate a more proactive civilian approach. Israel could lose its achievements if Hezbollah manages to retain its status in Lebanon. Therefore, supporting the training, arming, financial, humanitarian, and civil aid to Christians, Druze, and Sunnis opposing Hezbollah in Lebanon is a crucial need.
Nasrallah’s elimination is a dramatic move, we still face very tough days ahead, but the weekend's events have sparked hope for loosening Iran’s stranglehold.
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