The news of the murder of the six hostages is heart-wrenching, and it is hard to recover from it. For almost 11 months, their faces stared back at us from almost every corner, we heard their stories, and we saw pictures and videos of them. The news of their murder is painful; the hostages who were murdered were people we had come to know.
The frustration with the way the Israeli government is understandable: The lack of willingness to take responsibility for the major failure, the irresponsible economic policies, or the way the government handles of the state ceremony marking the anniversary of the massacre, all these and more have eroded public trust in the government among broad segments of the population.
The pollution of decision-making processes is the responsibility of the government, so it’s no wonder that even the Prime Minister’s tough security stance in negotiations is seen as being influenced by ulterior motives. The thing is, this stance is entirely legitimate, yet anyone who dares to question the idea of a “deal at any cost” is subjected to gaslighting in Israeli discourse. Those who warn about the price Israel might pay for “buying peace” are silenced, as if we hadn’t just gone through October 7th. No matter what's one opinion on this issue, every Israeli should be concerned about the dynamics of herd mentality and intolerance for minority opinions. This rigid mindset could develop into our next October 7th surprise in a few years .
Even some of the protest leaders are pushing things too far. Opinion leaders seek to set the country on fire as if Israel were not fighting for its survival. This behavior creates a sense among many right-wingers, who criticize the government's conduct, that those leading the protest aren’t genuinely offering a constructive alternative. The breakdown of Mamlachtiyut - a value which emphasizes the importance of the state and the national interest over sectoral or private interests - on both sides (with the responsibility primarily on the government) is pushing Israeli society back into identity politics. The rapid shift from discourse on the hostage deal to discourse on democratic rules undermines Israel. A constitutional crisis during a war is a recipe for collective suicide.
The entire Israeli discourse is conducted as if the enemy neither sees nor hears us. As if our debate is about how to respond to reality, when in fact, our debate is creating that reality. The bitter truth is that the protests against the government, justified as they may be, are distancing us from securing a hostage deal. When some accuse the government of the hostages’ deaths, it incentivizes Hamas to murder more hostages.
Hamas’s war goals are to negate those of Israel. Hamas hopes that as long as Israel fails to achieve its objectives and finds itself isolated internationally, the economy will collapse, and the spirit of Israeli society will be broken. Hamas’s goal isn’t merely survival, unless Israel's goal is to eliminate its rule. If Israel insists on controlling the Philadelphi Corridor, Hamas will turn that into a target. Israel wants all the hostages back, so Hamas won’t allow it. Hamas’s hiding places are dwindling. So far, Hamas has managed to evade capture and move prisoners from place to place. But when Hamas is cornered, they prefer to kill the hostages rather than strike a deal, sharpening Israel’s cruel dilemma between rescuing hostages and toppling Hamas’s rule. The deal that Hamas might agree to would likely undermine Israel’s central objectives. Any gains Israel might achieve in such a deal would be mere residual victories.
So what can be done? We call for the adoption of several working assumptions:
Israel faces three existential threats: the military-security threat from Hamas and the resistance axis led by Iran; the delegitimization of Israel’s right to defend itself and its very existence; and social resilience based on cohesion and solidarity. These threats feed off each other, and their significance and weight fluctuate over time. At present, the threat Hamas poses to Israel’s national resilience is greater than the military threat it represents.
At this time, social cohesion and national resilience depend on Israeli willingness to strike a deal for the hostages. The deal depends on Hamas, but Israel’s willingness to pay the price, in a way that reflects the government’s commitment to its citizens and mutual responsibility, is a prerequisite for the rehabilitation of Israeli society.
It is important to distinguish between the ‘long’ war, which will last several years, and the short war. Israel must end the long war with Hamas no longer ruling Gaza, but a tactical compromise on the Philadelphi Corridor might be right for the current situation.
A pause in the war that returns hostages home is an important goal, but it will only be a truly strategic move if Israel uses it to build the capabilities to uproot Hamas’s presence in Gaza and to confront Iran and its proxies.
A long-term victory over Hamas will be achieved if Israel thwarts the trends Hamas seeks to set in motion as a result of the war: to demoralize and break the spirit of Israeli society from within, to disrupt normalization with Saudi Arabia, to solidify its status as the representative of the Palestinian people, to break the “siege” and isolation of Gaza, to institutionalize the multi-front threat, and to free its prisoners from Israeli jails. Hamas may achieve some of these in a deal, but Israel’s commitment to preventing all the rest is the long-term recipe for its downfall.
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