A Proposal for a New Approach
The hearts of Israelis swelled with emotion at the return of the captives while simultaneously skipping a beat at Hamas' display of power. After 15 months of its leaders hiding in tunnels and failing to provide basic services to its citizens, Hamas fighters have donned uniforms, reclaiming effective control on the ground. This display of power has led many Israeli commentators to frame the war as a failure.
One of the fathers of modern military theory, Carl von Clausewitz, famously stated, "War is merely the continuation of policy by other means." Similarly, Israel must see the diplomatic arena as an extension of the war itself. Rather than prematurely summarizing the campaign’s achievements, it is critical to understand that the results will be determined by the processes it initiates in the months or years following its conclusion (see here). These processes can be influenced through diplomatic means, and Israel is in an excellent position to capitalize on them.
Updating War Objectives?
Israel cannot afford to forgo the achievement of its key war goals concerning Gaza: dismantling Hamas' rule, eradicating its military infrastructure, and, of course, securing the release of hostages. Without Hamas' defeat, the security of Gaza envelope's communities will remain dependent on agreements with an organization whose very existence is predicated on the destruction of Israel, making the rehabilitation of these communities unlikely under such conditions.
In addition to pursuing these goals, Israel must also work to undermine Hamas' core objectives. According to our analysis, Hamas' main goals are:
Establishing itself as the most authentic representative of the Palestinian people and the "defender of Jerusalem."
Sowing despair and breaking the spirit of Israeli society from within.
Undermining Israel's regional and international legitimacy.
Hamas has been willing to sacrifice the lives of tens of thousands of Gazans to achieve these goals, which it values even more than its own survival as a governing entity in Gaza - an insight often overlooked by Israeli analysts.
Israel can advance its objectives while simultaneously disrupting Hamas’ core goals by integrating military action with diplomatic measures.
Israel’s Efforts to Dismantle Hamas
Leveraging the Reconstruction Project
A clear distinction must be drawn between essential humanitarian aid and the conditional reconstruction of Gaza’s infrastructure. The primary avenue for restoring Hamas' power lies in the massive reconstruction project anticipated after the war’s conclusion.
Israel, for moral, international, and practical reasons (such as facilitating additional hostage releases), cannot avoid providing humanitarian aid to Gaza. While there is some overlap between humanitarian aid and reconstruction, the two are not identical.
Israel may find a receptive audience for its demand that Hamas relinquish its rule as a precondition for full reconstruction of the Gaza Strip. Even a Hamas-supportive country like Qatar is unlikely to fund Gaza’s rebuilding without assurances it won’t have to repeat the process in the future.
Hamas likely understands this dynamic. Recent internal Palestinian discussions about forming a joint expert government (technocratic government) indicate a potential move toward dismantling Hamas’ rule. Such a scenario could enable Israel to achieve both an end to Hamas’ official governance (albeit not through outright surrender as Israel might prefer) and a broad or complete hostage deal. However, this scenario would also likely involve Hamas adopting the “Hezbollah model,” maintaining only a limited government presence while preserving its military infrastructure.
Additionally, a report released today highlights President Trump’s discussion with Jordan’s King Abdullah about hosting Palestinians as part of a broader reconstruction initiative. This plan involved relocating over a million Palestinians from Gaza to neighboring countries (see a similar solution we proposed exactly one year ago). Although this initiative has low feasibility, the mere fact it has been raised likely alarms Hamas. It also serves as a testament to the organization’s diminished practical veto power over international political initiatives.
The Need for a Decision on Israel’s Humanitarian Policy
Recent statements suggest that the Israeli government has internalized the necessity of revising its humanitarian aid policy, recognizing its connection to maintaining Hamas’ governing capabilities (As Atchalta recommended prior to these statements). Despite international pressure, the government instructed the defense establishment to prepare for direct distribution of aid in Gaza, bypassing international organizations. However, this directive has not been implemented.
Israel is caught in a dilemma: on one hand, the humanitarian crisis plays into Hamas’ hands; on the other, reconstructing Gaza while Hamas remains in power would signify a victory for the terror organization. The solution lies in distinguishing between preventing a humanitarian disaster, a moral imperative and an Israeli interest, and conditioning Gaza’s infrastructure reconstruction on Hamas’ removal. Israel cannot avoid the difficult choice between re-establishing an Israeli civil administration in Gaza or working with the Palestinian Authority (PA). Either alternative is preferable to the current situation.
Yet, coalition-related interests have hindered Israel’s ability to make or implement such decisions. Meanwhile, the indecision has its price, Hamas continues to exploit incoming aid, looting and selling supplies at inflated prices in Gaza’s markets, amassing an estimated billion dollars.
Establishing a Regional Coalition
Hamas’ October 7 attack was partly motivated by a desire to disrupt Israel-Saudi normalization talks. Freezing these discussions served as a reward for Hamas. Yet, this unique set of circumstances offers Israel a historic opportunity to rebuild a U.S.-led regional order, bolstering its security for years to come.
Creating such a coalition, united against Iran’s network, would be an ideological and strategic defeat for Hamas. This effort could align with a major reconstruction project in Gaza, conditioned on forming a government free of Hamas. Gulf states, particularly the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain, possess extensive experience in Islamist deradicalization and could significantly influence Gaza’s trajectory if involved in the reconstruction process.
Shaping a Revitalized Palestinian Authority
In Israel, there is little enthusiasm for working with the PA. However, despite efforts to cultivate local leadership or to work with Gulf states as an alternative to Hamas, Israel will ultimately conclude that the Palestinian Authority is the lesser of two evils. What Gaza lacks is an alternative to Hamas. The PA whether in its current or renewed form, will not perform the military tasks on behalf of the IDF, but it can undermine Hamas’ standing and potentially create a public and ideological alternative to it.
To avoid legitimizing the PA, Israel has refrained from setting conditions for necessary reforms. Consequently, the past year has seen growing international recognition of a Palestinian state, forcing Israel to collaborate with the current PA, as seen with recent operations at the Rafah crossing.
Instead, Israel could drive efforts to build a revitalized PA with limited attributes of sovereignty to align with its national security interests. This would include an Israeli monopoly on military power and oversight of sensitive areas that are related to the PA’s legal systems, education content, budget, and participation in international forums (see here Atchalta’s paper on Revitalized PA).
Although a revitalized or existing PA cannot replace the IDF’s role militarily, it could undermine Hamas’ status and offer a public and ideological alternative to its dominance.
A Diplomatic Move to Dismantle UNRWA
Beyond Hamas’ influence over UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Works Agency) and the involvement of some staff in the October 7 atrocities, dismantling UNRWA - a mechanism perpetuating the refugee issue - is a strategic necessity.
Eliminating UNRWA would also remove the unique definition of inherited Palestinian refugee status in Gaza and elsewhere in the Middle East. Updating refugee registries alone would drastically reduce their numbers, effectively removing the refugee issue from the Israeli-Palestinian agenda. A war concluding without a "right of return" would deal a symbolic blow to Hamas.
To make last year’s Knesset legislation against UNRWA impactful, a diplomatic push under a favorable Trump Administration is required. While formal UNRWA dismantling through the UN seems unlikely, practical dissolution via funding cuts and economic pressure could achieve the same result.
An Updated Security Doctrine for Border Communities
Even if Hamas’ governance were replaced by a technocratic government, dismantling its military infrastructure cannot rely solely on diplomatic means. Additionally, international, U.S., and internal pressure could render a full military campaign against Hamas unfeasible.
In such a scenario, Israel would need to develop a security doctrine focused on prevention - continuous disruption of enemy capabilities through targeted operations, preemptive strikes, and combined military, diplomatic, economic, and cyber measures.
As part of this effort, Israel will need to reinstate and update its territorial defense strategy for border communities. This approach, implemented during the state’s early years, transformed border communities into an integral part of Israel’s first line of defense. The state must work to integrate residents of these communities into the local defense framework, including organizing, arming, and training them to enhance their ability to respond to threats. Additionally, it must strengthen the infrastructure of these border communities to ensure the continuous and effective presence of both residents and security forces.
Antisemitism and Israel’s International Standing
One of the war’s severe consequences is the damage to Israel’s international standing and image. This reality stems not only from harrowing images from Gaza, amplified by Hamas' strategy, but also from a social, political, and legal campaign led by pro-Hamas groups in the West, including Islamists and radical left-wing organizations.
Israel must devise a strategy to counter the rise of pro-Hamas antisemitism in the West. The ideological threat posed by Hamas extends beyond its military capabilities, influencing public opinion, pressuring previous U.S. administrations to limit aid to Israel, and framing the conflict as one between oppressors and oppressed.
Recognizing this form of antisemitism as a national security issue, and must collaborate with pro-Israel organizations to weaken Islamist influence in the West and combat antisemitism as part of its broader campaign against Hamas.
To Conclude
Despite Hamas’ displays of strength and the release of prisoners, the organization has suffered significant losses, including half its fighters and much of its leadership. Public support for Hamas in Gaza has likely hit a historic low amid the devastation it has brought, and internal discourse is increasingly critical of its achievements. With Hamas now more ‘visible’ after emerging from tunnels, public anger may be directed at it.
Implementing the objectives outlined in this document as Israel’s diplomatic goals could deliver a psychological blow to Hamas. Israel has an opportunity to find a balance between formulating an effective humanitarian policy that doesn’t empower Hamas and leveraging reconstruction to remove Hamas from power in Gaza.
Israel maintained the Abraham Accords during the war, and the current ceasefire creates an opening for a U.S.-led regional coalition with Saudi Arabia. Efforts to establish a renewed PA that doesn’t threaten Israel could provide an alternative to Hamas in Gaza while addressing the humanitarian challenge.
Dismantling UNRWA would symbolize and substantively puncture Hamas’ victory narrative. Clear-headed, strategic decision-making will enable Israel to achieve its war objectives and reshape the post-war reality in its favor.
Finally, it is important to remember that statements made by Israeli spokespersons are also heard in Gaza. Statements of self-criticism and talk of failure, in and of themselves, shape reality and influence
post-war trends. The more clear-sighted the perspective on these matters and the more the aforementioned steps are implemented, the closer Israel will come to achieving its war objective
Comments