Haniyeh, Sinwar, Raisi, Nasrallah, Assad – all of these were the architects and spearheads that led Israel into an existential strategic predicament. Their death and downfall are, first and foremost, a major opportunity for Israel. Until a few months ago, the Shiite axis and Hamas, backed by Russia, were leading a regional strategy that at times seemed almost flawless. The rapid collapse of this system is an almost miraculous outcome.
The Iranian conception has collapsed along with the ring of fire surrounding Israel: the major implication for Israel of Assad's fall is the prevention of Iran's participation in the large-scale future reconstruction project in Lebanon and Syria, which held the potential to restore Iran to a position of regional power. Billions of dollars in Iranian investments in nurturing its proxies in Syria, Lebanon, and Gaza have already gone to waste. Iran's defense systems, which relied on the Iranian ring of fire and air defense capabilities, have been wiped out. Iran's nuclear project is now more exposed than ever to Israel.
Hezbollah: From a Terror Army to a Local Militia
Hezbollah is expected to become a local group struggling for its survival. Iran's limited ability (and likely motivation) to rehabilitate Hezbollah in light of losing Syria, as well as Israel's withdrawal from the approach of prioritizing calm at all costs, even at the risk of emboldening enemies, will turn Hezbollah into a much weaker organization that will have to primarily face challenges from within Lebanon.
It is unlikely that the new system in Syria, composed of various factions with different agendas and priorities, will unite against Israel, certainly not in the near future. The Islamists leading the rebellion are not Zionist sympathizers and are ideologically closer to Hamas than to Iran. However, they currently lack the ability to support what remains of Hamas in Gaza in the same way as Iran. Rebel factions near Israel’s border, more affiliated with the Free Syrian Army, have already had tactical contact with Israel and are considered less extreme than the rebellion’s northern leaders.
It appears that the central focus of these groups in the coming years will be internal. They will likely aim to establish rules of engagement and power-sharing within the country, or alternatively, engage in violent internal struggles for dominance. Extreme scenarios involving the takeover of Syria by ISIS-like groups are not very likely at the moment. What is more concerning is the potential spillover of the Islamist winter into Jordan.
Israel: Fostering 'Proxies' and the Nuclear Dilemma
To seize the opportunity, Israel must begin working with 'proxies' in the region. Although Israel was burned by its attempt to support local forces during the First Lebanon War, times have changed. Support in training, weapons, funding, and humanitarian aid to the Kurds and Druze, for example, is essential at this moment.
The future of Iran's nuclear program has now entered a critical decision-making period. The temptation for an Israeli strike is very high, and assuming (without any concrete knowledge) that Israel has the capability, it might wish to act before Trump enters the White House. Since Iran is aware of this, it may become more flexible in reaching a nuclear agreement or, alternatively, pursue the nuclear option with full force. Tense and fateful days lie ahead.
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