Why hasn't Israel attacked Iran's nuclear facilities and taken advantage of proxy weaknesses, particularly Hezbollah?
Any analysis must be approached with humility, acknowledging unknowns: we don’t know the content of private dialogues between Israel and the U.S., Israel's actual capabilities and limitations, potential “deals” with Gulf states, or the true status of Iran’s nuclear progress.
However, as we noted after the elimination of Nasrallah, the end goal of this gradual process, beginning with the beeper strike and progressing through Hezbollah leadership eliminations, appears to be leveraging Iran’s strategic vulnerabilities to hinder its nuclear project. This is Israel’s multi-phase plan to dismantle Iran's nuclear capabilities.
The recent Israeli offensive likely severely impacted Tehran’s air defense and ballistic missile production capabilities - measures Israel would have needed to take for a direct attack on Iran's nuclear infrastructure. Although the current U.S. administration is concluding, it was made clear that the U.S. would not support an attack on nuclear facilities. Thus, Israel adhered to the operational boundaries set by the U.S., while strategically targeting layers of protection surrounding Iran’s nuclear program.
Israel is positioning itself to be capable of a strike against Iranian nuclear capabilities with manageable costs, which could enable it to either launch an attack or push for a more favorable nuclear agreement post U.S. elections.
Strategic Impact of the Offensive on Israel:
Iran:
Israel has maneuvered Iran into a dilemma regarding its response. Estimates suggest that Iran fired approximately 15% of its ballistic missile stockpile across two engagements with Israel. Lacking the capacity to produce new missiles in the near future, Iran is now highly exposed and unlikely to waste additional missiles. Iran’s decision to respond is contingent on developments in the near future.
Lebanon:
Israel is concluding maneuvers near the Lebanese border. While not aimed at eliminating Hezbollah, and despite not ruling it out entirely, it’s improbable that Israel will extend its operations toward the Litani River. At the end of this maneuver, Israel will control territory that could turn Hezbollah’s demand for an immediate ceasefire, before negotiating details, into a double-edged sword for the organization.
Israel may find it advantageous to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities after securing a ceasefire with Hezbollah. Should Hezbollah renew hostilities following an Israeli strike, it would underscore the opposition against it within Lebanon.
Gaza:
Hostages: Israel’s restrained offensive has reduced the likelihood of escalation into a full regional war with Iran, increasing the prospects for a hostage deal. Following Hamas leadership’s alignment with Sinwar’s hardline stance after his elimination, there may soon be a willingness to offer concessions that Sinwar himself would not have accepted in his lifetime.
Humanitarian-Civil Control of Gaza: This issue is likely to reemerge. After initial indications that Israel intended to impose a partial siege on northern Gaza (per what became known as ‘the generals plan’), Israel surprisingly backtracked, likely due to U.S. pressure concurrent with the Iran offensive. Israel’s core dilemma revolves around three options: establishing military governance, transferring control to a restructured Palestinian Authority (as outlined in our December analysis), or outsourcing civilian control in Gaza.
The entire Middle East could be impacted by the upcoming U.S. elections. In the past few weeks, Israel has bolstered its regional standing and deterrence capabilities, dismantling Iran’s tightening encirclement. These are substantial achievements, yet to capitalize on them for long-term Israeli interests, clear diplomatic goals are essential - objectives that Israel’s leadership has so far refrained from setting
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