Israel's declared goal for the escalation in Lebanon is to return the evacuated residents of northern Israel to their homes. However, it is doubtful that Israel has a reliable military option to decisively defeat Hezbollah, while it still strives to do so in Gaza against a much weaker enemy. Therefore, it is unlikely that this objective can be achieved through military means. It’s easy to be dazzled by Israel's impressive Beeper's operation, but Hezbollah is being captive by its own rhetoric and won’t allow the return of the evacuees before a ceasefire is reached in Gaza. Therefore, we suspect that returning the northern residents isn’t Israel’s real objective.
Much has been written about Israel being a tactical operation powerhouse but suffering from a chronic lack of long-term strategy. In the current escalation in Lebanon, Israel is using some of its "doomsday weapons," yet has not embarked on a full-scale war. Will we again witness intense tactical maneuvers that ultimately result in strategic disappointment?
Israel understands that this war represents a moment of truth. The realization has set in that the Iranian ring of fire around it, aimed at its destruction, will only continue to develop. The harsh reality is that while the IDF may need a ceasefire to recover and prepare for what’s next, our enemies would exploit such a truce more effectively and arrive better prepared for the next round. Hamas would gradually rehabilitate, Hezbollah would replenish its missile stock and find suitable replacements for its senior commanders, the proxy forces in Syria would complete their deployment, the Houthis would increase their stockpile of hypersonic missiles, and most significantly, by the next round, we would face a nuclear Iran.
If an intense military campaign can't return the northern residents or destroy Hezbollah, what then should be the objective of the escalation? In our view, it should be exploiting Iran's strategic weakness and act against its nuclear project.
After years of fortifying its hegemony in the Middle East, in practice, Iran has now subjugated its interests to those of Hamas. The former commander of the Quds Force, Qassem Soleimani, likely studied the war literature of Sun Tzu, the 6th-century BCE Chinese philosopher, who argued that “the supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting.” Soleimani built a ring of fire around Israel to exhaust it until it collapses. Although Iran is preparing for the possibility of full-scale war, it doesn’t desire one and believes that the ring of fire it built is sufficient to conduct a low-intensity kinetic war that will make life in Israel unbearable, undermine its economy, erode its international legitimacy, and eventually break the spirit of Israeli society. Iran’s nuclear project is primarily intended to thwart the possibility of a full-scale war declaration against it.
Hamas, on the other hand, has embarked on what it sees as "the final war." This is a total, unrestricted war with no end in sight, intended to trap Israel in a chronic state of attrition and multi-front challenges (thus, there’s no scenario of a hostage deal where everyone returns home). While Iran isn’t opposed to a full confrontation with Israel, this isn’t its preferred course of action at this time. There’s a built-in tension between these approaches: Hamas seeks Israel's destruction now through high-intensity total warfare, while Soleimani’s approach aimed to gradually erode Israel over time, likely without a full-scale war. This difference in strategy is, in our opinion, the main reason Hamas didn’t inform Iran or Hezbollah about the timing of its October 7th attack. It’s also why Hezbollah seeks to make a clear distinction between the low-intensity war of attrition it is conducting as a sign of solidarity with Hamas, and its revenge operations (for example following the ‘beepers operation’). These revenge 'high-intensity actions of short barrages' are presented as “one-offs”, after which it aims to return to the routinely limited war of attrition. This approach of Hezbollah could change of course.
Both approaches means Israel would be facing a long attrition that it seemingly can’t afford, yet can’t prevent. Given this reality, Israel's escalation can only become strategic if its goal is to fundamentally change the broader picture - the return of the northern residents is not such a goal because Hezbollah will not disappear but will merely hold its fire until the next round.
Hezbollah is the true "iron dome" protecting Iran’s nuclear program, with more potential to harm Israel than Iran itself. Therefore, systematically and intensely degrading Hezbollah's capabilities would be strategic if it eventually aims to pave the way for the destruction of Iran's nuclear project. Even if Israel destroys the Iranian nuclear project, it will continue to face a challenging reality, but one that is immeasurably better than a reality in which Iran is a nuclear state. This is a risky move, but it may be Israel's last chance to steer the wheels of history in the making, which don't look very promising.
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